Abbildungsverzeichnis; Tabellenverzeichnis; 1 Einleitung; 2 THE GIFTED AMATEUR: Gesellschaftliche Leistungen von Bürgerjournalisten und deren Folgen für den professionellen Journalismus; 2.1 Die gesellschaftlichen Leistungen von Bürgerjournalisten; 2.1.1 Bürgerjournalismus und das Ideal des herrschaftsfreien Diskurses; 2.1.2 Bürgerjournalismus und das Ideal des professionellen Journalismus; 2.2 Die Folgen des Bürgerjournalismus für den professionellen Journalismus; 2.2.1 Qualitätsverlust im Journalismus; 2.2.2 Entgrenzung des Journalismus als Profession
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The present study aims to reconcile conflicting evidence from previous research on the role of objectivity in journalists' and citizens' information behaviors. Drawing on news quality frameworks and confirmation bias research, the article proposes a model of "biased objectivity" that was tested by a quasi-experiment with 430 journalists and 432 citizens in Germany. Results show that both perceived objectivity value (news quality perspective) and attitude consistency of a message (confirmation bias perspective) enhanced the informational value of a message, with objectivity value mediating the effect of attitude consistency on informational value perceptions ("biased objectivity" perspective). Journalistic professionalism did not moderate this relationship.
Abstract: Um im Internetzeitalter als Profession sichtbar zu bleiben, müssen Journalisten ihren Mehrwert gegenüber Bürgerjournalisten deutlicher herausstellen. Ein Experiment prüft, inwiefern sich deutsche Journalisten in einem ihrer wichtigsten professionellen Abgrenzungsmerkmale – der Objektivitätsnorm – von Bürgern ohne journalistischen Hintergrund abheben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich Journalisten in Objektivitäts-Verpflichtung und -Bewusstsein kaum von Nicht-Journalisten unterscheiden. Jedoch nehmen sie im Gegensatz zu Nicht-Journalisten Objektivitäts-Verstöße durchaus wahr und erfüllen damit eine zentrale Voraussetzung zu selbstkritischer Reflexion, die für die professionelle Identität von Journalisten zunehmend entscheidend wird
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Der vorliegende Aufsatz unternimmt den Versuch, die einst für die Kommunikationswissenschaft höchst relevante "Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz" des Sozialpsychologen Leon Festinger erneut ins wissenschaftliche Bewusstsein zu rücken. Während der Dissonanzforschung innerhalb der Psychologie auch heute noch Erkenntnispotentiale zugesprochen werden, ist sie in der Kommunikationswissenschaft kaum mehr von Bedeutung. Betrachtet man aber aktuelle Forschungsfragen, mit denen sich Kommunikationswissenschaftler beschäftigen, fällt auf, dass gerade die Dissonanzforschung alternative Erklärungen für gegenwärtige Probleme in Mediengesellschaften bieten kann. Diese Annahme wird am Beispiel der Politikverdrossenheit und unter Rückgriff auf das Konzept der "Dis-Identification" einer explorativen Prüfung unterzogen. ; This paper attempts to reconsider the value of Festinger's "Theory of Cognitive Dissonance" on mass media topics. Investigations in cognitive dissonance still represent an important field of research in social psychology. Yet, despite having once been one of the most important psychological theories on selective exposure, the concept is barely seen as relevant to current communication studies. Indeed, Festinger's assertions have lost scientific importance in media studies. However, if one examines the present research topics in communication science, several objects of investigation can be identified that seem to call for psychological explanations in general and for Dissonance Theory predictions in particular. Thus, a reintegration seems to be worthwhile. The author exemplifies this intention by connecting political malaise with the concept of "Dis-identification".
This thematic issue includes ten articles that address previous contradictions in research on two main trends in digital democracies: news avoidance and political polarization. Looking at these contradictions from different angles, all contributions suggest one aspect in particular that could be important for future research to investigate more specifically possible countermeasures to harmful trends: the individualized, self‐reflective way in which media users nowadays engage with political content. The increasingly value‐based individualization of media use may be a hopeful starting point for reversing harmful trends to some degree by addressing individual media users as a community with a common base of civic values, rather than addressing them in their limited social group identities.
Public criticism of professional media is omnipresent in many democratic societies. This debate has often been examined concerning what the audience demands from the media (expectations) or how they evaluate media performance (evaluations). Based on a representative, quota-based online survey of the German population in 2019, this study examines citizens' expectations, evaluations, and the discrepancies between both, as well as their relationship with media trust, socio-political predispositions—particularly populist attitudes—and individual media use in high-choice media environments. Results show that citizens have high expectations of the media which they mainly do not see fulfilled and that expectation-evaluation discrepancies are related to lower media trust in the case of particularly important and/or most noticeably underperformed media functions. Both expectations and evaluations were associated with populist attitudes, but only in the case of anti-elite attitudes in such a way that increased expectations collide with negative media evaluations. For anti-outgroup attitudes, instead, the analyses show a generally negative assessment of journalistic media, both in terms of expectations and evaluations. Media use does only play a minor role.
Public criticism of professional media is omnipresent in many democratic societies. This debate has often been examined concerning what the audience demands from the media (expectations) or how they evaluate media performance (evaluations). Based on a representative, quota-based online survey of the German population in 2019, this study examines citizens' expectations, evaluations, and the discrepancies between both, as well as their relationship with media trust, socio-political predispositions - particularly populist attitudes - and individual media use in high-choice media environments. Results show that citizens have high expectations of the media which they mainly do not see fulfilled and that expectation-evaluation discrepancies are related to lower media trust in the case of particularly important and/or most noticeably underperformed media functions. Both expectations and evaluations were associated with populist attitudes, but only in the case of anti-elite attitudes in such a way that increased expectations collide with negative media evaluations. For anti-outgroup attitudes, instead, the analyses show a generally negative assessment of journalistic media, both in terms of expectations and evaluations. Media use does only play a minor role.
Contemporary democracies are increasingly shaped by a surge of populism, posing serious threats to the idea of liberal democracy. Particularly in the run-up to elections, knowledge of such threats is essential for citizens to cast an informed vote. Against this background, the present study examined the likelihood of media users to engage with political news providing critical perspectives on populist movements in a 24-hour social media field experiment during the 2017 federal election campaign in Germany (N = 210). Based on two selective exposure measures, findings suggest that exposure to critical news is contingent upon the conceptualization of populist partisanship as a political orientation of either high commitment (i.e., voting intention) or high affinity (i.e., sympathy for a party). While high commitment triggered a rather classic confirmation bias, especially regarding click decisions, high affinity caused selection patterns to be more strongly guided by informational utility, particularly during newsfeed browsing, with counter-attitudinal information receiving more attention. When public sentiment cues were present, however, attitudinal patterns disappeared. These findings imply that partisan news use in times of political upheaval is best gauged by taking a closer look at the particular type of partisanship that guides selective exposure, as both types of partisanship caused contrary exposure patterns, and that today's news environments potentially override attitudinal influences by providing additional social monitoring cues.
Contemporary democracies are increasingly shaped by a surge of populism, posing serious threats to the idea of liberal democracy. Particularly in the run-up to elections, knowledge of such threats is essential for citizens to cast an informed vote. Against this background, the present study examined the likelihood of media users to engage with political news providing critical perspectives on populist movements in a 24-hour social media field experiment during the 2017 federal election campaign in Germany (N = 210). Based on two selective exposure measures, findings suggest that exposure to critical news is contingent upon the conceptualization of populist partisanship as a political orientation of either high commitment (i.e., voting intention) or high affinity (i.e., sympathy for a party). While high commitment triggered a rather classic confirmation bias, especially regarding click decisions, high affinity caused selection patterns to be more strongly guided by informational utility, particularly during newsfeed browsing, with counter-attitudinal information receiving more attention. When public sentiment cues were present, however, attitudinal patterns disappeared. These findings imply that partisan news use in times of political upheaval is best gauged by taking a closer look at the particular type of partisanship that guides selective exposure, as both types of partisanship caused contrary exposure patterns, and that today's news environments potentially override attitudinal influences by providing additional social monitoring cues.